2001Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Constitutional Law by Anderson, Christopher A.
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 9
Spring 2002
2001Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases:
Constitutional Law
Christopher A. Anderson
Roger Williams University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anderson, Christopher A. (2002) "2001Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Constitutional Law," Roger Williams University Law
Review: Vol. 7: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol7/iss2/9
422 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:403
Constitutional Law. Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168 (R.I. 2001).
Appeal from the denial of an application for postconviction relief on
the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and the denial by
the hearing justice to grant a new trial based upon a claim of newly
discovered evidence. The Rhode Island Supreme Court explicitly
refused to create a new rule requiring trial justices to inquire into
whether or not a defendant has willingly and knowingly given up
their right to testify on their own behalf.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In January of 1984 an elderly resident of Providence was bru-
tally murdered and his apartment ransacked.' The defendant, Mr.
Michael Brennan and his brother Thomas were arrested, tried sep-
arately and convicted for felony murder. 2 The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court upheld both convictions.3  The defendant
subsequently applied for and was denied post conviction relief
leading to the instant appeal.4
ANALYSIS
The defendant's appeal alleged two primary points of error.5
First, that he was deprived of a fair trial by the ineffective assis-
tance of his trial counsel.6 Second, that the post-conviction relief
court erred by not granting a new trial upon newly discovered
evidence. 7




5. The defendant raised a third point of error claiming that the post-convic-
tion hearing judge should have corrected an error of fact that arose during the
direct appeal of his conviction in the supreme court. The superior court held that it
lacked the authority to correct a finding of fact made by the supreme court. The
supreme court quickly dismissed this claim of error on procedural grounds. The
court found that the defendant failed to file a motion for rehearing in the supreme
court within five days of its ruling as required under Rule 25 of the S. Ct. R. of
App. P. By not requesting a rehearing in the supreme court, the defendant waived
his right to correct the alleged error. Id. at 174.
6. Id. at 170-73.
7. Id. at 173-74.
SURVEY SECTION
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that an ineffective as-
sistance of council claim will be evaluated under the two-part test
laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, and adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
Barboza v. State.8 The first prong of the Strickland test requires
that the defense counsel be so deficient as to have violated the con-
stitutional protections of the Sixth Amendment. 9 Satisfying this
prong requires "that counsel's representation [fall] below an objec-
tive standard of reasonableness," given the facts of the specific sit-
uation.' 0 If this test is met, then the second prong requires that
the deficient performance by counsel be shown to be so prejudicial
that the defendant's right to a fair trial was jeopardized."
In this case, the defendant asserted that his counsel was inef-
fective for three reasons, (1) his counsel failed to adequately pre-
pare the case, (2) his counsel refused to allow him to testify on his
own behalf and (3) that he was denied the opportunity to assist in
jury selection. The court dismissed each of these assertions. 12 The
court found that Mr. Brennan's attorney was an experienced trial
attorney and that there was no indication that he failed to properly
prepare the case; that the defendant was involved in the jury selec-
tion process and that the defendant was in fact offered the opportu-
nity to testify but voluntarily chose not to.1 3
The most significant development from this portion of the case
is the court's refusal to adopt a rule requiring a trial justice to in-
quire whether or not the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily
waived his/her right to testify. 14 The court noted that while some
jurisdictions require this proactive inquiry, the majority of juris-
dictions do not.15 The supreme court has affirmatively decided to
follow the majority position, leaving the burden of advising a de-
fendant of their rights on the defence counsel and not the trial
justice.' 6




12. Id. at 170-73.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 171-72.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 172.
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Newly Discovered Evidence
The court also reiterated that motions for a new trial based
upon newly discovered evidence are evaluated under the two-part
test found in McMaugh v. State.17 The first part of this test re-
quires the trial justice to carefully examine the proffered new evi-
dence to determine if, under the circumstances, the evidence is in
fact new evidence.' 5 This inquiry includes evaluating whether or
not the defendant actively sought to uncover the evidence during
the primary trial; whether the evidence is material to the actual
issue and not simply cumulative or impeaching and that it would
likely change the outcome of the trial.' 9 If this first requirement is
satisfied then the hearing justice must determine if he/she feels
the evidence is credible and warrants granting relief.20
In this case, the alleged new evidence was a sworn affidavit
from the defendant's brother stating that he had committed the
murder.2' This confession came about after the brother had al-
ready been convicted of the murder and his chances for post-con-
viction relief were all but gone. 22 As such, the supreme court found
that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion when it deter-
mined that the confession was unreliable and thus not worthy of
consideration. 23
CONCLUSION
In Brennan v. Vose, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reiter-
ated that the two part Strickland test will be applied to claims of
ineffective assistance of council and that the two-part test found in
McMaugh will be applied to claims for relief arising from newly
discovered evidence. Further, the court definitively declined to re-
quire the trial court to actively investigate whether a defendant
17. Id. at 173 (citing Fontaine v. State, 602 A.2d 521, 524 (R.I. 1992); State v.
Lanoue, 366 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1976)).
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing McMaugh, 612 A.2d at 731 (citing Fontaine, 602 A.2d at 524;
State v. Brown, 528 A.2d 1098, 1104 (R.I. 1987))).
20. Id. (citing McMaugh, 612 A.2d at 732).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 173-74.
23. Id. at 174.
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has knowingly and willingly chosen to waive their right to testify
in their own defense.
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